低功率霍尔推力器阳极供气环工程设计关键参数仿真

为了提高低功率霍尔推力器放电通道内中性原子分布均匀性,采用有限元方法对阳极供气环关键结构参数进行优化研究。针对双腔式阳极供气环结构,重点分析了缓冲腔容积比以及缓冲腔隔板导流小孔数量等关键参数对阳极供气均匀性的影响。研究结果表明:随着缓冲腔容积比的增大,阳极供气环出气孔差异率先快速减小后趋于稳定,其中当容积率k=1.0时,平均差异率和最大差异率分别为1.77%和3.79%;隔板间导流小孔数量从8增加到14时,出气孔差异率呈现浴盆曲线特性,其中导流孔数量为10时,平均差异率和最大差异率分别为1.8%和3.8%。研究结果可为霍尔推力器阳极供气环工程设计提供理论支撑。     

多管火箭炮重复毁伤概率模型及仿真

针对火箭炮武器系统对集群目标射击中重复毁伤概率无法求解的问题,基于火炮射击理论和毁伤理论,建立了火箭炮对集群目标射击时重复毁伤概率模型,基于像素法和矩阵法对作战想定中的重复毁伤问题进行了仿真,并与模型所得理论计算结果进行了对比分析。仿真结果表明:重复毁伤模型具有较高的精度,适用于火箭炮武器系统对集群目标射击中有效毁伤效率的校正和重复毁伤概率的求解。     

气浮箱型结构纵荡运动水动力系数解析研究

基于二维微幅波理论,采用特征函数展开和匹配渐进法建立了气浮箱型结构纵荡运动的解析解,将Matlab程序计算结果与MOSES数值模拟结果进行了对比分析,验证了程序的合理性;进而对不同吃水、不同水深下结构纵荡运动的附加质量系数和阻尼系数的幅频变化规律进行了研究。结果表明:由于未考虑结构内部气体的可压缩性,数值模拟结果大于程序计算结果,MOSES计算结果偏安全;在一定频率区段上,吃水的增加对结构附加质量系数和阻尼系数有显著影响;随着水深吃水比的增加,结构的附加质量系数和阻尼系数呈增大趋势,只有在圆频率为0.65~0.9 rad/s时呈减小趋势,而阻尼系数则呈增大趋势。     

CONTRIBUTORS

Russia holds the largest stocks of civilian highly enriched uranium (HEU) of any country, operating more than fifty research reactors, pulsed reactors, and critical assemblies using HEU, as well as nine HEU-fueled icebreakers. Russia's participation in international efforts to phase out civilian HEU is crucial if international HEU minimization efforts are to succeed. Individual Russian institutes and organizations participate in international programs to replace HEU with low-enriched uranium in Soviet-supplied research reactors, develop alternative fuels, and repatriate fresh and spent HEU fuel from third countries. However, an overarching national policy on HEU phase-out has yet to be adopted. There are many obstacles to obtaining such a commitment from Moscow. At the same time, the ongoing reform of the Russian nuclear industry and plans for expansion of domestic nuclear power generation and for increased nuclear exports create opportunities for securing such a commitment.     

THE ACRS EXPERIENCE AND ITS RELEVANCE TO THE WMDFZ CONFERENCE

This article examines the arms control logic that was applied to the only regional arms control talks that have taken place in the Middle East to date: the Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) working group that was part of the multilateral track of the Madrid peace process in the early 1990s. It highlights both the successes and major constraints of the ACRS talks in an effort to assess what might be relevant to the weapons of mass destruction-free zone conference proposed for later this year. In addition to the basic arms control dilemmas that will continue to challenge this conference—as they did ACRS—the article suggests that current conditions in the Middle East are even less conducive to regional dialogue than they were in the earlier period, due to the internal upheavals in several key Arab states, and the specific challenge of Iran's move to develop a military nuclear capability.     

THE MIDDLE EAST WMD-FREE ZONE CONFERENCE

This article reviews the origins and evolution of the Middle East weapons of mass destruction-free zone (WMDFZ) concept and the proposal for a 2012 conference on the subject, and explores new challenges and opportunities for regional arms control in the current regional environment. It suggests that new models may be necessary to revitalize regional arms control efforts. The establishment of a broad regional security forum could include, but should not be limited to, curtailing weapons of mass destruction through the zone approach. Even if the 2012 conference fails to materialize, or is limited to a one-time event, the proposal for such a conference has provided an important opportunity to rethink future options for a regional arms control and security process.     

A Bioterrorism Prevention Initiative

ABSTRACT

The threat of terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction remains a daunting concern. Governments have undertaken several initiatives at the national and international level to prevent such illicit use, yet challenges remain. Notable is the absence of a single collaborative international forum of experts dedicated solely to bioterrorism prevention. The establishment of a Bioterrorism Prevention Initiative could be a possible solution to address this gap. This article explores possibilities for such an initiative and the ways in which it could strengthen the existing bio-nonproliferation regime.     

RUSSIAN NAVAL NUCLEAR FUEL AND REACTORS

Russian naval nuclear fuel and reactors pose both proliferation and environmental threats, ranging from the possible theft of highly enriched uranium fuel to the radioactive contamination of the environment, whether due to accident, neglect, or sabotage. Current conditions at Russian naval bases, together with a history of accidents and incidents involving Russia's nuclear fleet, make a convincing case for the large-scale assistance that the G8 is now providing to improve the safety and security of Russian naval reactors and fuel. However, virtually no data has been released to allow accurate, reliable, and independent analysis of reactor and fuel properties, risking misguided international efforts to assist in the areas of nuclear cleanup, nonproliferation, and security. This article identifies and assesses relevant properties and developments related to reactor and fuel design, provides a comprehensive presentation of Russian nuclear naval technologies, and examines technological trends in the context of proliferation and environmental security.     

From stopping to preventing atrocities

The Constitutive Act of the African Union (AU) provides for the right of the continental body to intervene in the face of war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity. According to its formulation, Article 4(h) intervention entails military force, which is triggered when a target state fails to discharge its duty to protect its population from mass atrocities. Although Article 4(h) is an ambitious statutory commitment to intervene in a member state by the AU, the Libyan crisis in 2011 showed the ambivalence of the continental institution to act in a decisive and timely manner. The AU's failure to invoke Article 4(h) exposed the need for building the capacity and political will to intervene and to interpret Article 4(h). Therefore, the primary focus of this article is on how Article 4(h) should be interpreted. Flowing from the Pretoria Principles, which seek to provide clarity on the implementation of the AU's right of intervention, Article 4(h) should be viewed as a duty rather than a right to prevent or stop mass atrocities. The duty dimension of Article 4(h) derives from the international instruments that AU member states have ratified to prevent mass atrocities. Rather than being a paper tiger, Article 4(h) should be used in a proactive and timely manner as a military option available to the AU to persuade member states to prevent or halt atrocities. As a last resort, military force pursuant to Article 4(h) should aim at protecting the population at risk and pursuing the perpetrators in order to avoid contravening Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN). Although military intervention can save lives in the short term, it cannot necessarily address the underlying, structural causes of atrocities, such as ethnic rivalries, economic inequalities and scramble for natural resources, among others. Therefore, the prevention of mass atrocities should not be equated with, or be seen through the prism of, Article 4(h) intervention alone. The focus should instead be on the entire spectrum of preventive strategies at the disposal of the AU in the face of mass atrocities, including the African human rights system and the African Peer Review Mechanism.     

THE NUCLEAR THRESHOLD STATES

“Nuclear threshold states”—those that have chosen nuclear restraint despite having significant nuclear capabilities—seem like the perfect partners for the reinvigorated drive toward global nuclear disarmament. Having chosen nuclear restraint, threshold states may embrace disarmament as a way to guarantee the viability of their choice (which may be impossible in a proliferating world). Supporting disarmament efforts affirms their restraint, both self-congratulating and self-fulfilling. Additionally, the commitment to their non-nuclear status springs at least in part from a moral stance against nuclear weapons that lends itself to energetic support of global disarmament. However, threshold states also offer significant challenges to the movement for nuclear weapons elimination, in particular in relation to acquisition of enrichment and reprocessing facilities. This article analyzes both the challenges and opportunities posed by threshold states by examining the cases of Brazil and Japan.